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Challenging the Soft Power Analysis




1 In  March  17 2013,  the  first  advisor  for  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Naci  Koru
(belonging to the AKP majority), declared that the Turkish schools [part of the Gülen
Movement, a religiously inspired Turkish movement] were the main actor of Turkish
foreign  policy  in  the  world  (Zaman,  17  mars  2013).  Nine  months  later,  the  conflict
between  the  Erdoğan  government  and  the  Gülen  Movement  reached  its  zenith  on
December 17, 2013, when a Turkish public prosecutor filed a case for corruption against
personalities close to the AKP government (including sons of  ministers).  The Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (President of the Turkish Republic since August 2014)
accused the Gülen Movement of being the dark force behind this case1. Consequently,
the official discourse of the Turkish minister of education dramatically changed. From
acknowledging the role of the Turkish schools as a positive actor for Turkey’s cultural
influence, the discourse shifted to a denunciation of the actions of the Turkish schools
in the world as a danger, blaming them for indoctrinating students all over the world,
and stating that they should instead become Turkish state-controlled (Maasho 2015). As
one of the most striking sign of this disavowal, the Turkish minister of education took
back its support from one of the most followed events of the year in the Turkish media:
The  Turkish  Olympiad,  organized  by  associations  openly  belonging  to  the  Gülen
Movement in which children from all over the world, schooled in Gülen schools abroad
(known as Turkish schools) would come in Istanbul to perform Turkish poetry, songs
and folkloric dances as a testimony to Turkey’s growing influence abroad.
2 What appears behind this  surprising shift  of  public  discourse concerning the Gülen
Movement’s schools is the idea, taken for granted, of their strong influence (positive or
negative according to one’s political orientation) on Turkey’s image beyond its borders.
In this article, we will question the concept of soft power with regards to the concrete
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consequences of the educational action of the Turkish Muslim Movement, the Gülen
Movement in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The Gülen Movement: an overview
3 The Gülen Movement (GM) is a Muslim group formed at the end of the 1960’s in Turkey
whose discourse focuses  on the social  commitment of  its  followers  to  “service” for
humanity (hizmet in Turkish, which is the name its members use to describe the Gülen
Movement as a whole)2. Built around the charismatic personality of Fethullah Gülen, a
Turkish preacher who currently resides in the USA, the movement is inspired by Sufi
writings, and particularly the neo-Sufi Nurcu group (the followers of Saïd Nursi). This
religious tradition focuses on education which is considered a way to combine modern
reasoning and religious faith thus good morality  in order to preserve a  threatened
Islamic civilization. Fethullah Gülen became famous in the 1970’s for the charismatic
speeches he was giving as an imam in Izmir. During this period, a small number of
university students started constituting this group, organizing reading camps within a
military  atmosphere.  In  the  next  decades,  this  growing  number  of  individuals
organized  in  religious,  educational,  financial  (Asya Finans),  business  (with  the
businessmen association TUSKON) and media institutions (with several press and TV
media  groups)  connected in  a  vast  network with a  great  capacity  to  mobilize  both
human and financial resources. The network used the phases of the political opening of
Turkish  politics  (such  as  in  the  80’s  when  Özal’s  Motherland  party’s  [ANAP]
government  and  the  Gülen  movement  started  to  collaborate  in  the  framework  of
economic liberalization) in order to expand, and tried to lay low during the repressive
periods (in 1980 the Gülen Movement supported the military coup trying to show his
pro-state  vision,  but  was still  persecuted).  In  1999,  officially  for  health reasons but
linked to trouble with the Turkish judiciary, Fethullah Gülen fled to the USA. Yet in
2002,  the  arrival  of  the  AKP  (the  Justice  and  Development  Party,  a  right  wing
conservative party) as a governing party opened a new phase of collaborations between
these two actors both inside and outside Turkey. Consequently, Ankara relied upon the
Gülen movement as a resource for its international opening. 
4 Indeed,  the  followers  of  this  faith-based  movement  created  a  tremendous  network
around the  world.  The network of  schools  dramatically  expanded over  the  past  20
years, starting with Central Asia (Balcı 2003) at the beginning of the 1990’s, Africa and
the Balkans in the second-half of the 90s and the USA and Europe from the end of the
90s  (Van Bruinenssen 2014).  Turks  started establishing schools  in  Africa  from 1996
onwards, opening schools in more than 40 sub-Saharan countries.
5 The  peculiarity  of  the  Gülen  movement,  a  successful  national  and  transnational
religious  enterprise,  has  been  widely  studied  by  academics.  A  first  trend  of  the
literature on the Gülen Movement (Yavuz, Esposito 2003; Yavuz 2003; Özdalga 2000,
2005; Turam 2007) in terms of civil society, focuses on the way the Gülen Movement as
a religious group can be a democratizing power in Turkey. These authors tend to draw
the genealogy of the movement to locate it in the religious and political context of
Turkey. A second trend (Balcı 2003; Tittensor 2014) characterizes the Gülen movement
as a religious organization by inserting it into the framework of globalization. These
authors refer to the idea of mission in order to describe the educational activities of
this religious movement worldwide. A third trend (Agai 2004; Hendrick 2012, 2013),
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more centered on a sociology of the movement in itself, implements an organizational
analysis describing its functioning from the inside. These authors try to explain the
dynamics of commitment in the movement and the way its structure evolves according
to  the  different social  contexts.  This  article  follows  the  third  trend,  focusing  on  a
sociological analysis of the Gülen movement as an institution. Yet it attempts to fill in a
gap in these works by introducing the point of view of the recipients in a dynamic
manner to understand what the Gülen movement as an institution represents for the
actors  (Turkish  or  African):  their  interactions  are  what  constitutes  the  concrete
experience of the Gülen movement, on a daily basis3.
 
The Gülen Movement between Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa
6 Different reasons explain the strong educative investment of the Gülen movement in
sub-Saharan Africa. Religiously speaking, Africa is perceived by the followers as a poor
continent  both  economically  and  morally,  necessitating  the  help  of  teachers-
missionaries  willing  to  fight  against  “poverty,  ignorance,  and  intolerance4”.  In  this
sense, the followers implement a liberal conception of education in Africa focusing on
the elite’s formation (Angey forthcoming). What’s more, Africa is a continent with a
strong  economic  potential  arousing  the  interest  of  emerging  countries  like  China,
Brazil and Turkey. In Turkey, businessmen close to the Hizmet work hand in hand with
the Turkish teachers to open schools (L’Afrique… 2011). These educational activities by
Turkish actors in Sub-Saharan Africa have also been encouraged in the framework of
the Turkish opening to Africa betting on the economic potential of Turkish–African
exchanges  almost  nonexistent  until  the  beginning  of  the  1990’s  relying  upon  the
initiatives of private actors such as the Gülen Movement (Angey 2014). Africa has for
long been a land of  experimentation for hybrid forms of  religious enterprises  both
exterior  and  local.  As  such,  this  article  is  part  of  a  wider  literature  concerning
transnational  religious  enterprises  in  Africa  which  both  “transcend  national
boundaries  and  reinvent  ‘nations’  that  have  authority  to  provide  matrices  of
universality” (Fourchard, Mary, Otayek 2005), thus questioning the authority of states
to  structure  the  circulation  of  its  citizens.  Among  these  transnational  religious
enterprises, a few networks such as Aga Khan (Daftary 2003) and the Gülen movement
have been successful in opening elite schools targeting rich students. 
7 Part of the students of the Turkish schools in Africa (whose proportion varies according
to the social context, the financial strength of the movement in this country, and the
educative opportunities provided to the nationals there) decide to pursue University
studies in Turkey. Is it the success of what is often called “Turkish soft power”?
 
Purpose and argument
8 According to Nye, soft power relies upon attractiveness, as a means to shape what the
other  wants  in  a  sense  that  is  convenient  without  having  to  resort  to  coercion  or
payoffs (Nye 1990). My article will focus on education, which constitutes an element of
Nye’s soft power definition. The soft power literature concerning Turkey rather tends
to focus on diplomacy and business since Turkey as an emerging country had not been
until  lately  an  important  education  center  in  the  world.  The  literature  on  Turkish
foreign influence often uses “soft power” without a critical view. It can be presented as
a synonym of “diplomacy” as opposed to “military power” (Çandar 2009) that reduces
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the  scope of  the  definition given by  Nye.  In  other  cases,  it  is  used in  a  normative
manner (soft power is seen as the power of a democratized, economically open Turkey
whose  ability  to  combine  Islam  and  democracy  is  seen  as  an  inspiration  by  Arab
countries)  without  questioning  the  power  balances  hidden  behind  this  concept
(Altunışık 2008). In this sense the contribution of Kerem Öktem and Yohanan Benhaïm
(in this EJTS issue) shows the political stakes of labelling soft power in Turkey. 
9 Through a concrete case study focusing on one aspect of Turkish influence beyond its
borders, higher education, this article calls into question the relevance of the use of the
concept of soft power in the studies focusing on Turkish initiatives towards foreign
countries. Nye (2005) used higher education as an exemplary resource of attraction. In
his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), Nye focuses on types of
attraction that can develop soft power. According to him, the three main vectors of soft
power are culture, foreign policy and political values. He divides culture between high
culture  (education,  art,  literature),  addressing  the  elites,  and  popular  culture,
addressing mass entertainment. 
10 In  this  perspective,  our  theoretical  criticism  of  the  concept  of  soft  power  will  be
structured around 3 points.
11 First  of  all,  according  to  Nye,  education  is  a  source  of  soft  power,  understood  as
attractiveness, as a way to shape others’ desires. Students who come and study in a
country would keep a close link with the country they studied in which would in turn
be useful  for  the  country  of  reception,  when those  students  take over  positions  of
power  in  the  economy  or  the  political  sphere  of  their  own  society  (Nye  2005).
Consequently, many academics convey this type of idea as an obvious truth, without
testing it.  We  are  not  denying  the  possibility  for  an  experience  of  educational
socialization in a country to have a consequence over one person’s trajectory, making
him more sympathetic with the country. Yet empirical evidence must be gathered in
order to confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, as Stuart Hall’s famous case study focusing on
the encoding and decoding of media messages shows, we know that emitting a message
or putting in motion an action does not mean it is going to be taken for granted by
those who receive it (Hall 1973). In this case, my criticism would focus on the obvious
idea  that  African  students  schooled  in  Turkey  will  be  part  of  the  rapprochement
between Turkey and the African continent. This idea cannot be asserted as a generality
without any proper ethnographic study. Studying the “decoding” by African students
of  the Gülen Movement’s  objectives is  a  way to reintroduce the recipients  into the
equation, and thus refuse along with Michel de Certeau to consider them as passive.
Consequently, I intend to study the “arts de faire”, the inventive tactics of the African
students  as  “the  ingenious  ways  in  which  the  weak  make  use  of  the  strong,  thus
lend[ing] a political dimension to everyday practices” (Certeau 1984: XVIII). 
12 The second set of criticism focuses on the unclear conceptualization of the relation
between public and private actors in the soft power theory. In Nye’s theory, it seems
that the action of private actors will necessarily go in the way of a wider national soft
power. Or whenever it goes the other way, Nye just seems to give both private and state
actors the possession of different soft powers without going further. The soft power
concept thus fails to describe the complexity of situations of expansion of public and
private actors outside Turkey and the complicated conflictual, negotiated, supportive,
“discharged” (Hibou 1999) type of relations that exist between them. 
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13 The last set of criticism questions the centrality of “attractiveness” in the soft power
theory. The fact that a country is capable of bringing students from foreign countries to
its universities is analysed as one of the main proofs of a country’s attractiveness, a
sign of a country’s strength. Yet, from the African students’ point of view, educational
choices are entailed in a field of possibilities (“champ des possibles” in French). Taking
into account the national, cultural, historical and economic frames in African students’
choices is necessary to produce a rigorous analysis of their experience in the Gülen
Movement.
14 I argue that the concept of soft power can be considered as a “category of practice”
(used by actors in everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities, of
what  they  share  with,  and  how  they  differ  from,  others).  However,  it  cannot  be
accepted as a “category of analysis” (the “experience-distant categories used by social
analysts” in an academic context) (Brubaker, Cooper 2000). In an effort to go “beyond
the concept of soft power”, I will stress the complexity of situations of influence, types
of actors and interactions between them. The relations between Turks and Africans in a
situation where the Turkish actors try to gain influence over Africans will be at the
centre of the article.
15 Here I intend to show how the strategy of influence developed by a private actor such
as the Gülen Movement whose members are moved by their own agendas can be re-
appropriated,  re-interpreted  by  African  individuals  that  experience  their  own
trajectory from Africa to Turkey in this movement. To do so, I will rely upon a micro-
level  study  of  the  migration  of  African  students  to  Turkey  who  came through the
channel of the Gülen Turkish schools in Africa to pursue their studies in Istanbul.
16 The  methodology  used  is  a  qualitative  one  with  interviews  with  seventeen  African
students or former students who came to Istanbul through the GM: three from Nigeria
(a man and two women), eight from Senegal (five women and three men), two men
from South Africa and three men from Kenya. Sixteen of the interviewed were schooled
in a university close to the Gülen Movement (Fatih University) which includes in its
ranks students who just finished the Gülen secondary schools all around the word5. In
the  framework  of  my  PhD  thesis  research  in  Kenya,  South  Africa,  and  Senegal  I
developed connexions with African students in Fatih University. The Nigerian students
are the main African group of students in Fatih University (along with Malians) and I
met them while socializing with other African students and attending social events in
the university. All those students had just finished high school when they first arrived
in Istanbul. When interviewed, they were between 19 and 26 years old (one of them had
already graduated and was a businessman in Istanbul by that time) at undergraduate or
post-graduate  levels  in  scientific,  information and communication technologies  and
management areas (which is the speciality of Fatih University). Most of the interviews
were  informal,  given  that  interknowledge  networks  had  brought  us  together.
Participant  observation  has  also  been  conducted  in  the  Light  Houses6 of  Istanbul,
apartments where students of the Gülen movement stay together. I was invited to stay
over at some Light Houses for female students (since gender separation in home spaces
is  strict  in  the  Gülen  Movement)  and  also  attended  events  where  the  “African
community” would gather as such in the public spaces of the university. This research
was carried out between 2011 and 2014.
17 I argue that unlike the preconceived idea that any education would be both a sign of
attractiveness and a source of ability to shape other’s countries desire in the way the
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Turkish state would want to (what a soft power type of analysis would conclude), the
migration of African students to Turkey through the Gülen Movement represents a real
challenge  for  the  Gülen movement  itself.  Furthermore,  it  would  even represent  an
obstacle in its strategy of influence on African elites and on the deepening of Turkey’s
collaboration with them.
 
II. The Role of the Gülen movement in African
students’ mobility in Turkey 
18 First of all,  I  will describe the factors through which African students schooled in a
Turkish school in their country of origin decide to come to Istanbul in order to pursue
their university studies7. 
 
Reaching elite families
19 Turkish schools are established in around 40 African countries. The school fees are high
(between  3,500  and  8,500  euros  per  year  with  boarding  in  the  studied  countries8)
allowing the schools to recruit children from rich families (to which can be added a
proportion of students receiving a scholarship on a criterion of excellence).  African
parents send their children to these schools because of their very effective preparation
for national exams based on a very competitive conception of education.
20 As a university professor and a member of the Board of the Gülen Movement’s schools
in South Africa puts it during an interview in Johannesburg:
The  people  we  are  targeting  are  going  to  be  important  political  leaders  or
businessmen. By educating them and making them respectful human beings with a
sense of responsibility they will behave well with their inferiors who will do so with
their inferiors and so on.9
21 This  relies  upon  a  pyramidal  conception  of  society  and  an  elitist  vision  of  social
progress.  From  a  strategic  organizational  perspective,  imposing  such  high  fees
furnishes economic resources for the schools to grow (schools are part of non-profit
organizations where the money earned aims at expanding the network of schools). As
one of board member of the South African network puts it “If we chose to open charity
schools we would open one school in each country. Since it is private, we can open ten schools
instead of one”. But above all, the objective is to target potential economic and political
resources through the African students. Indeed, this strategy provides a direct access to
a number of rich African families, most of them active in business or politics that are
very useful resources for the Gülen movement. For example, the father of a Senegalese
Turkish school student is doing both politics and owns one of Dakar’s football teams.
The  Senegalese  businessman  and  Turks  of  the  Hizmet  in  Senegal  have  been  doing
business and he is now renting the field over which the new school of Dakar has been
built. Lastly, it provides a link with the future elite of the African country and some
access to resources. As an important figure of the Gülen Movement in Istanbul states:
Of course we tend to reach rich and remarkably clever people. Because their reach
within the society will be wider than the reach of a taxi driver or a bakkal owner for
instance. If we can touch them, we can also touch more individuals. These people
will have influence.10 
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22 Having an influence over local elites is a way to spread the movement’s values but also
to obtain facilities (in infrastructures, business, political support, etc.).
 
The strategic ambiguity in the African settlement
23 Joshua Hendrick defines the Gülen Movement as a “graduated network of affiliation”
structured  in  different  circles.  These  circles  correspond  to  different  degrees  of
adhesion to the values of Fethullah Gülen and of commitment to the social actions of
the movement. The most central circle is the Cemaat, the hierarchized circle at the core
of the community. The second one is constituted by the Arkadaşlar, a large network of
devout persons living according to the teachings of Fethullah Gülen. Then come the
Sympathizers, supporters of the action of the Hizmet who participate from time to time
in  activities  organized  by  the  movement  to  support  them.  Last  but  not  least,  the
consumers  are  those  individuals  who,  sometimes  without  even  knowing  it,  “buy”
products of the GM’s (education, business) for the mere reason that they are the best
available in a competitive market place.
 
Fig. 1. Different degrees of commitment and adhesion in the GM as presented by Joshua Hendrick
24 “Strategic ambiguity” means members of the Gülen Movement would adopt different
practices and discourses according to the different circles of sociability they are in. “
The Gülen Movement network  mobilizes  in  accordance  with  an ambiguous  prescription of
action (aksiyon) which allows its followers to consistently redefine their identity to meet any
obstacles or challenges that might arise” (Hendrick 2012: 207). According to the location of
an  individual  in  the  circles,  there  is  a  change  of  discourse  and  practices  that
characterizes the “strategic ambiguity” of the GM as a whole. This is the scheme on
which  the  Gülen  Movement  based  its  expansion.  It  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  our
research reveals most of the African students coming to study in Turkey did not know
of Fethullah Gülen before coming to Turkey and had no idea of the existence of a vast
network of followers over the world (see below).
25 Here I will examine the factors of African students’ choice of mobility in Turkey.
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The Gülen Movement’s ability to attract through flexibility and
transnational resources
26 The Gülen Movement ability to attract students from Africa to Turkey relies upon the
strength  of  its  network  as  a  horizontal  space  of  integration.  Indeed,  it  connects
different  housing institutions,  schools  and businesses  in  a  transnational  space.  The
network allows the GM to have facilities for the transfer of students from Africa to
Turkey, since it has the economic and social resources to do so. In spite of it being
widely spread, the GM distinguishes itself by its effectiveness in creating bonds with
outside people such as African students. As a Senegalese student in Istanbul puts it, “
Once you are with them, they will not let you down”. 
27 The  capacity  of  the  movement  to  integrate  individuals  and  produce  circulation
between  different  spaces  constitutes  the  main  explanation  of  the  success  of  the
movement  in  bringing  African  students  in  Istanbul.  Indeed,  when  asked  what
motivated them to go to Turkey, the African students in Istanbul mention the following
reasons:
28 Firstly, the decision of African students to study in Turkey is entailed in the field of
possibilities open to them when they are in Africa. The decision to go to Turkey appears
when their planned project of study in their home country, Europe, the USA or Canada
fails. It can be a problem with the visa (to Europe or the USA) or overly expensive fees.
It is also the case when the national education offer is perceived as unsuitable by the
students and their parents. It reveals that Turkey’s universities are not yet competitive
with the American, Canadian or European ones in the students’ imaginations.
29 The trajectory of  M.,  a  Senegalese male,  former student in Istanbul,  illustrates  this
motive: “When the Turks [Here the Turkish teachers of the Gülen school in Senegal]
offered me to go to Turkey for my studies my first reaction was to refuse because, well,
I know them and they are too narrow-minded for me and at school well I was not a big
fan of them. But my mum told me I had to go to a foreign country and that, well, Cheick
Anta Diop’s university (Dakar’s most prestigious public university) was a mess, always
on strike, no money. So eventually I decided to go to Fatih University (in Istanbul)11”. 
30 D., another Senegalese former student in Istanbul, now living in Dakar, goes further:
“Actually, my dad sent me to the Turkish schools because they [the Turks from the
Gülen Movement in Dakar] let him know that I could obtain a scholarship for university
in a foreign country afterwards. And of course I wanted to go study in a foreign
country. That’s the thing in Senegal; we all wanted to go outside, to the States, Canada,
and France. In Senegal it’s almost compulsory if you want to work in a big company. My
dad and I really wanted me to go to Canada. After my baccalauréat, I applied and even
got accepted in a private university in Ottawa. But the fees were so high and the people
in my [Turkish] school could only help us to go to Turkey. So at the last minute,  I
accepted the offer to go to Istanbul12”. 
31 Here we can see that unlike what is presented in Nye’s theory, Turkey as a whole is not
perceived  as  an  attractive  country.  Instead,  the  students  prefer  Western  countries’
universities to pursue their studies. Even more, a private Turkish actor identified as
such by the African students, the Turkish schools of the GM, is perceived as attractive
because  it  might  give  them opportunities  to  study  in  the  USA or  Canada  (but  not
Turkey which is  never presented as  a  first  wish by students).  Entailed in a  limited
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horizon of possibilities, African students reassess their projected career by accepting to
go  to  Turkey.  Here  we  can  see  the  importance  of  the  different  local  contexts  and
opportunities offered to students. As our field research revealed, much less students
from South Africa came to Turkey to pursue their studies than Senegalese students.
Indeed, the educational opportunities in South Africa are greater and provide different
possibilities from selective quality public universities (University of Kwa Zulu Natal,
University of Wits) to private universities. Asked about this issue, a teacher in South
Africa stated “Of course for us it is tougher to send students to Turkey. Because in South Africa,
there are  many good universities,  so  students  are  not  as  eager  to  move as  in  other  African
countries13”.
32 Secondly, one of the main reasons brought up by African students who came to Istanbul
through the GM is the dedication of the teachers in their Turkish schools to persuade
them to go to Turkey. 
33 After her baccalauréat in the Turkish school of Dakar, a Senegalese girl, now a student
in Istanbul, had first registered in the Senegalese university of Cheickh Anta Diop in
medicine. “But we were more than 600 students in the medicine amphitheatre. While you know
in Yavuz (the Turkish school in Dakar) they took too much care of us. So I was not used to it14”. 
While she was hesitating to give up university in Dakar, she received a phone call from
the human resource responsible of her former Turkish school offering to enrol her for
the next semester in a Turkish university and to take care of all the administrative
steps. She finally accepted and has been studying in Turkey for 4 years.
34 This  brings  us  to  another  strength  of  the  movement  as  a  network  positioned  in
different social  spaces:  it  offers to take care of  all  the administrative steps such as
getting a visa and enrolling in a Turkish university for the African students. It  also
offers to host them in dormitories or shared flats. To sum it up, the resources of the
social  transnational  space constituted by the GM between its  different  countries  of
settlement  and Turkey are  used to  organize  the  transfer  of  students.  This  is  made
possible not only through the dedication of the teachers who do the follow-up, but also
through the network’s ability to mobilize the resources of  its  transnationality from
Africa to Turkey.
35 Lastly,  when trying to encourage the parents to send their  children to Turkey,  the
Turkish teachers in the Turkish schools of Africa may promote the image of Turkey as a
Muslim  conservative  country,  more  appropriate  than  the  Western  countries  for  a
student. Here when Turkish teachers in Africa try to persuade their Muslim students’
parents to send their child to Turkey they promote an idea of good Muslim morality.
Reportedly, Turkey is presented as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, a country of pious
Muslims at the image of their action in Africa. Here they project a model of Turkey as
an antithesis to Western countries (notably France and the USA), supposedly in moral
decay15. 
36 When asked why she  came in  Turkey after  studying in  a  Turkish  school  a  Muslim
female-student from Nigeria in Istanbul since 2011 answered: 
I don’t know, my dad convinced me. Because my dad says according to them in
Turkey I would be in a country with an Islamic background. And my dad wanted me
to have an Islamic background here. But of course it is the opposite here. Most of
them here [the Turks of Istanbul] don’t even pray, they don’t really cover their
heads. Here they have more of a European culture16.
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37 Turkish  teachers  in  Africa  manage  to  create  an  image  of  good  morality  which  is
reassuring for parents when they have to take the decision of sending their children
away from home.
38 Criticizing the vision of Nye concerning academic institutions as a source of soft power,
Todd Hall, associate professor of International Relations at Oxford University explains,
“it  is  difficult  to parse out attraction from other possible mechanisms” (Hall  2010).
Indeed, as demonstrated, the choice to study in Turkey for African students results
more from the strength of the network format of the Gülen Movement and from the
field  of  possibilities  in  which  the  African  students  are  embedded  than  from  an
attraction towards Turkey and its education system.
39 Furthermore, we can question another aspect of Nye’s theory according to which each
country would promote a fixed set of what constitutes its “values” to enforce its soft
power. Attaching specific sets of values to a country (as Nye did with the USA, whose
soft power would come from the values of democracy and liberalism it embodies and
promotes) in a normative way, blurs the reality of the competition of different groups
for  the definition of  a  nation’s  values.  In  Nye’s  literature,  soft  power is  sometimes
“employed to  advocate  and justify  a  certain  set  of  values  and a  specifically  liberal
conceptualization  of  American  identity  as  central  to  US  international  power”  (Hall
2010: 196). Similarly, the soft power literature concerning Turkey tends to essentially
associate with Turkey a specific set of values (changing according the time and the
authors) such as Turkey as a model of “laïcité” for the Muslim countries or in the 2000s,
Turkey  as  a  synthesis  between  capitalism,  democracy  and  Islam17.  Yet,  values  are
promoted by different groups (state and non-state actors) with their own framings and
conception of what is considered as good and evil, and an ideal society and their own
agendas. There is no essential set of values that would characterize Turkey. Instead,
different Turkish groups (various state actors ‑the army or the foreign ministry ‑, and
civil society actors ‑ business associations, NGOs and religious networks like the Gülen
movement) are trying to promote abroad political values they associate with Turkey
according  to  their  own  agenda.  In  the  case  of  the  GM,  promoting  Turkey  as  a
conservative Muslim country to the Muslims students’ parents is a way to attract them
to Turkey. It also corresponds to the ideal of the core followers of Fethullah Gülen in
Turkey  as  the  cradle  for  an  Islam  based  on  self-sacrifice,  community  and  social
activism. 
40 As we see, this African student who later on discovers Turkey has a fairly different
experience of what she perceives as Turkish culture. 
41 D., a former Senegalese student in Istanbul, now working in a Turkish school in Dakar,
Senegal, describes this discrepancy: 
The fact that many students have difficulties in Istanbul is due to the discrepancy
you see there in Istanbul. On the one side, they [the Turks from the Light houses in
Istanbul] are very strict, very conservative, which would be okay for us. But on the
other side, we can see that apart from the Hizmet [named given by the followers of
the GM to their group], the Turks don’t live this way. They drink, smoke and all. We
don’t want it but it’s just that they impose a frame to us and we can see that people
are not really living like this in Turkey. I mean in Istanbul at least.18
42 This  student  describes  the  experience,  necessarily  out  of  phase  with  the  vision
promoted by the Turks in the Senegalese school, of a complex Turkish society in which
different ways of life cohabitate.
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III. The African students’ trajectory from the margins
to the core of the GM
43 The success of the movement is demonstrated through its ability to channel an African
elite,  with  a  strong  economic  potential,  to  Turkey  where  it  will  be  schooled  in
universities close to the movement. The students pass through the transnational social
space of the Gülen Movement experiencing the different circles of sociability of the
movement. 
 
The movement from the consumers to the core of the GM
44 In their country, African students are part of the fourth circle corresponding to the
consumers.  They  enrol  in  a  Gülen  school  because  it  “is  the  best  available  in  a
competitive market place”. This idea is confirmed by interviews led both in the schools
in Kenya, South Africa and Senegal and in Turkey with African students showing that
most of them did not even know of Fethullah Gülen until they came to Turkey19. Once
arrived in Istanbul, the African students channelled through the GM get closer to the
core of the GM, since they are included in the circle of sociability of the Arkadaşlar,
those devoted friends of the GM (yet not pertaining to the decision-making group of
the movement, the Cemaat). As a South African student in Istanbul puts it, “That’s only
when we arrived here [in Istanbul] that we realized the big machine we were into”. In Istanbul,
the students are indeed entirely socialized into the core of the movement’s activities. 
45 As part of the strategic ambiguity, the existence of different circles of sociability also
implies a variation in the practices and discourses in the Gülen Movement itself. While
they  were  still  in  Africa,  the  Turkish  teachers  playing  the  role  of  intermediaries
between  Africa  and  Turkey  informed  them  that  they  could  be  offered  housing  in
Istanbul, which most of them accepted easily. Once arrived, students discover a rather
constraining context. A conservative life organization is much more strongly imposed
in the Arkadaș circle  of  the movement than on its  fringes.  First  of  all,  the housing
furnished to the African students is mostly Light Houses (Ișık Evleri). Funded according
to Gülen’s  recommendations,  these  are  places  for  the students  to  live  according to
Muslim  values.  They  are  conceived  as  a  protective  cocoon  for  Muslims  against  a
decaying Turkish society. In the GM’s Light Houses, every foreigner has to share his flat
with 3 to 4 other Turks so that he is encouraged to learn Turkish quickly. Then, the
students have to conform the strict  gender separation promoted inside the Arkadaș
circle of the movement according to which houses are gender separated and any mixed
social activity is strongly discouraged inside or outside the university. The curfew is at
6pm (in general, there is a certain room for manoeuvre in the different houses) and
internet is forbidden (even though every student now has it on his cell phone). At last,
the Muslim students from Africa are encouraged (even if it is not compulsory) to pray 5
times a day and are enticed to join the lecture camps where Nursi and Gülen’s books
are read. These rules are enforced by the abi (old brother) or abla (old sister)20 who look
after their fellow students in each house.
46 What’s more, most of the students attend universities close to the Gülen Movement in
Istanbul, such as Fatih University or Süleyman Şah University which have agreements
with the Turkish schools all around the world, which explain why most of the African
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students are directed towards them. In these universities,  a lighter yet still  present
social control is enforced, leaving them limited spaces for other types of behaviours.
47 As  a  consequence,  when  coming  to  Turkey,  the  students  experience  a  change  of
position  from  the  “Consumers”  to  the  “Arkadașlar” circle  of  the  movement  which
provokes strong reactions from the African students. This is a negative consequence of
the  “strategic  ambiguity”  of  the  movement  due  to  an  imbalance  of  information
between what African students expected and what they are confronted with when they
arrive in Turkey. This informational imbalance strengthens the opposition reactions of
African students (see below “African students’ reappropriation and diversions”). 
48 In Istanbul, during the preparation meeting of the festival “This is Africa” organized by
African  students  of  Fatih  University  to  promote  Africa  in  their  school,  one  of  the
African students expressed himself on the debate over extra-school activities which are
always  separated  between  men  and  women,  as  the  rest  of  the  African  students
complained. He declared: “We have to be able to adapt to this country and to this university.
By accepting to come here we knew what to expect”. Interestingly enough, the rest of the
African students in the public, answered vigorously “No, precisely, that’s what we did not
know !  That’s  the point”. Eventually,  the speaker corrected himself and admitted they
[African students] might not have been aware of the way of life they would be imposed
in Istanbul, but that still now that they were here, they should adapt21.
49 I would argue that the strategic ambiguity of the movement is a problem in the attempt
to “transfer”  African students  from the local  African space in  which they are  only
consumers of the GM into the Turkish space where they are expected to become active
members of the GM. 
50 Here again, the Christians students, coming from Africa through the Turkish schools to
Turkey should be differentiated. First of all, their number is, according to my research
in  Fatih  University,  very  limited  (a  few  from  South  Africa  and  from  New-Guinea).
According to the testimonies, this would not be due to a discriminating approach by
the Turks  in  their  schools  in  Africa,  but  rather  to  a  self-limitation of  the  students
themselves who identify Turkey first of all as a Muslim country and are less attracted.
Then,  the Hizmet Abi  and Abla seem to try to find a  negotiating way for the non-
Muslim students who arrive in Turkey. Non-Muslim students are offered to learn more
about  Islam,  they  are  enticed  to  join  the  reading  camps  but  are  not  compelled  to
convert and to pray22. 
51 As a Muslim Senegalese male student sums it up: “I think with the Christians they [the
Turks from the Hizmet] don’t really know how to behave. Generally they are cooler
with them. The Christians are freer than we are. They accept behaviours from them
that they would never tolerate from us, that’s for sure! 23”.
 
Strategies and tactics in the integration of African students in the
Gülen Movement
52 Sending students from Africa to Turkey is interesting from the point of view of the GM
since the inclusion of outside elites in its ranks is a way for the movement to keep
growing beyond Turkey’s borders. 
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Producing its own local African intermediaries
53 The  integration  of  African  students  is  part  of  the  GM’s  strategy  of  growth  as  an
organization. 
54 The students from Turkey living in the Light Houses in Istanbul and studying in the
same universities as their African counterparts, who accept to become active members
of the “Arkadașlar” circle, are seen as future active collaborators of the movement. They
are offered to become teachers or local managers of a school or a hospital created by
the movement in the world and if they succeed, they are destined to make a career in
the movement by circulating from country to country. They are then expected to enter
the transnational space of opportunity opened by the GM and to pursue their career
and experience a strong social promotion.
55 Even though they are socialized with their Turkish peers in the Light Houses in
Istanbul, the African students are not offered the same type of opportunity. They are
asked to play the role of intermediaries in the local insertion of the movement in their
country of origin,  but not to do a career in the transnational space of the GM. For
example, in South Africa, the Fountain Educational Trust offers South African students
scholarships  to  study  Islamic  and  educative  studies  in  Istanbul.  These  studies  are
targeted in order to educate students in Istanbul who will then be fit to collaborate
with the Turkish managers of the schools and play the role of intermediaries in the
South  African  territorialisation  of  the  movement  as  teachers,  for  instance.  The
objective  of  the  managers  of  the  Turkish  schools  in  Africa  is  to  have  locals  (i.e.,
Africans)  managing  the  Turkish  schools  in  their  own country  of  origin.  A.,  a  male
manager or Turkish schools in South Africa declares: “We want the schools to be run by
locals in Africa as it is the case in Central Asia. But these persons must support our values: we
would like them to be Hizmet-conscious.24 ”
56 African students are offered to become intermediaries in the local African space for the
Gülen movement but never a position as manager of the Gülen movement, as can be the
case for their Turkish peers. 
57 When asked about the reason why Africans are not offered the same opportunities as
the Turkish students, the same manager adds:
Because we need them: in South Africa there are teachers from Azerbaijan and even
Mongolia because now most of the schools in Central Asia are ruled by locals. So
teachers from Central Asia can become teachers in other countries. If it is not the
case for Africans, it is because we still need them locally in their own countries. [He
later admits:] But until now it did not work so much. We are still learning in Africa.
25
58 The  attempt  of  insertion  of  African  students  as  local  intermediaries  in  the  local
insertion of the GM in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to have a limited success. Interestingly
enough, the African students are not offered to circulate even in the African space,
where  circulation  of  teachers  is  still  limited  to  Turkish  members  of  the  Gülen
movement or Central Asians. The Central Asian former students, one of the regions
where  the  Gülen  schools  have  been  organized  for  the  longest  time  and  where  an
historical and cultural common history is shared, tend to play a large role in the ranks
of the Gülen missionaries all around the world. While African students, arguably only
for pragmatic management reasons (the Turkish missionaries still need to have African
intermediaries  in  the  schools)  are  still  only  directed  to  their  country  of  origin.  Of
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course,  other  questions  could  be  raised:  the  matter  of  cultural distance,  the  racial
frontier. But we cannot say anything conclusive on this topic, and can only stick to the
observation that  for  now,  African students  are  only  offered a  limited possibility  of
social promotion in the Gülen movement.
59 Consequently, African students tend to re-appropriate or even divert the frameworks
in which they are put.
 
African students’ reappropriation and diversions 
60 The African students arriving in Istanbul realize the informational imbalance in the
GM. Indeed they went  from a consumer role,  where they had no awareness  of  the
existence of the Gülen movement, to a central circle of the movement with the highest
level  of  constraints  on  their  life.  Meanwhile,  they  also  notice  that  the  only  career
proposed to them is a local carrier for the Hizmet movement back in their country of
origin,  and  that  there  is  no  possibility  of  social  promotion  for  them  in  the  Gülen
Movement’s  transnational  social  space.  What’s  more,  Africans  also  have  their  own
projects for themselves in their country of origin or in Turkey, taking into account that
most of them come from wealthy families providing them with social and economic
capital which widens their horizon of possibilities. 
61 Consequently, the African students tend to express their discontent and convert the
constraints of their experience into resources. By this I mean, they implement tactics
(Certeau 1984) in order to reappropriate some power relations:
I  call  a  ‘tactic,’  […],  a  calculus  which  cannot  count  on  a  ‘proper’  (a  spatial  or
institutional localization), nor thus on a border-line distinguishing the other as a
visible totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself
into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without
being  able  to  keep  it  at  a  distance.  It  has  at  its  disposal  no  base  where  it  can
capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with
respect to circumstances. […] because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on
time — it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on the wing.’
Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to
turn them into ‘opportunities.’ The weak must continually turn to their own ends
forces alien to them (Certeau 1984: XX).
62 In the framework of this new environment in which African students are immersed
with its own unknown codes, Africans are going to invent tactics, seizing opportunities
in their everyday life in the Gülen Movement’s Istanbul to renegotiate their position. 
To  describe  their  varied  behaviors,  I  shall  use  the  typology  proposed  by  Albert  O.
Hirschman (1995), in which the different types of demonstration of discontent in an
organization  are  categorized.  He  presents  exit,  voice and  loyalty as  three  possible
conducts in case of disagreement or dissatisfaction. I added the category of “exit with
benefits” as a fourth possible conduct.
63 Exit consists  in  the  silent  demonstration  of  discontent  by  leaving  a  social  group.
Numerous  students  coming  from  Turkish  schools  in  Africa  decide  to  leave  the
movement totally.
64 A 20 year-old Nigerian female student in Bahçeșehir University decided to leave the
Light House and then the whole movement after only a week:
I just kept crying and crying because I was afraid to be alone [She was the only
Nigerian in the house and the other Turks were not speaking good English] and
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they were controlling everything I was doing. It was too much. So I just decided to
register  in  the dormitory of  my university,  here  in  Istanbul.  At  first  they were
calling me to try to make me take part to the activities they even called my dad to
scare him, saying that I would not be able to manage by myself in Istanbul. But now
they totally gave up and I have literally no contact whatsoever with the movement.
26
65 This student, coming from a wealthy family quickly decided to get out of the Light
House, where she felt the constraints would be too heavy. Through a Nigerian friend
she got to know in the university she decided to take her independence extremely
quickly and cut the contacts with the movement. As we can see, she came to Turkey
through  the  movement,  which  persuaded  her  to  come  and  helped  her  with  her
application  process  for  university  and  the  visa  but  then  decided  to  get  out  of  the
movement, which could easily be done since her family was rich and her dad supported
her choice.
66 What I call “Exit with benefits”, is a progressive exit from the movement while using the
resources it can procure for the construction of one’s own career. Africans can use the
resources proposed by the GM in Turkey in order to prepare their future exit from the
movement.
67 The following profile  corresponds  to  a  Senegalese  male  former student.  During his
university studies, this student slowly took his distance from the movement, left the
Light House until cutting every contact with the core of the movement at the end of
university. But he used the network of businessmen he met and his knowledge of the
Gülen  movement’s  economic  institutions  like  TUSKON  to  be  hired  in  an  African
company  located  in  Turkey.  He  used  the  resources  he  could  access  through  his
experience  in  the  GM (learning language,  economic  networking)  that  he  developed
patiently for years in the prospect of making a career for himself.27
68 Many  students  are  in  this  same  situation.  Very  few  of  them  abruptly  leave  the
movement after a few months only. Most of them keep a link with the movement even
if  they  leave  the  Light  Houses  (which  is  very  common  in  the  African  students’
community).  They  take  part  in  the  business  summits  organized  by  TUSKON  as
translators,  for  instance.  While  progressively  leaving,  they  take  advantage  of  the
networks and resources made available to them in Turkey by the Gülen Movement.
69 Hirschman defines Voice as an individual or collective protest aiming at changing the
organization or one’s position in the organization from the interior.
70 A rich Senegalese student in Fatih University refused to pray and did not respect the
curfew. As a strategy to impose her desire for more freedom, she threatened to call her
father, with whom the Turks from the Turkish schools are doing business in Senegal.
The  supervisor  of  their  flat  was  afraid  that  she  would  complain  and  tarnish  the
reputation of the Turkish schools and teachers in Dakar. They decided to let her be. She
is the only girl I know in all the Light Houses provided with a single bedroom and a
more flexible curfew.28
71 Here exit and voice can reinforce each other. Indeed, to be really efficient, the voice
strategy must be coupled with the threat of exit (Bennani-Chraibi 2009). This case is
extremely  relevant  since  it  shows  the  negotiations  of  power  between  Turks  and
Africans  using  the  different  territories  of  the  movement.  This  student  used  her
powerful  family  in  Senegal to  re-establish  a  balance  of  power  with  the  Turkish
members of the GM she is in contact with in the Light House of Istanbul. By playing the
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card  of  “the  movement’s  image  in  Senegal”  she  managed  to  secure  a  comfortable
position  for  herself  in  Turkey.  She  converted  her  social  capital  in  Senegal  in  the
Turkish space using it as a threat.
72 The fourth type of conduct in the case of discontent is loyalty. Loyalty reveals a feeling
of faithfulness and duty towards the organisation. 
73 A Senegalese female student in Fatih University, who at the time of the interview had
been in a Light House for 3 years states:
I decided not to do anything. I decided I would rather participate and try to benefit
from the experience, you know. Even if some aspects annoy me I am not as angry as
others [other African students]. And they [the abla from her house] lately asked me
if I wanted to be an abla (Angey forthcoming). I still hesitate because I know that
they  [the  Turks  from  the  GM]  don’t  give  you  anything  without  asking  you  for
something in return. At first I was really criticizing them, but you know they have
good ideas and good people in here, it is just that sometimes their actions, the way
they behave are wrong. But that’s because they don’t know much.29
74 Most of the students interviewed resort to this type of behaviour.  They stay in the
movement which bring them comfort (housing and food is paid for by the businessmen
of the GM), a securing circle of sociability (many African students if they are critical of
the project of the Light Houses tend to highlight the personal bonds created with Turks
of their Light House) and at the same time find spaces to express their discontent when
they are with other African students with whom they socialize a lot once they are out
of their house (in the university or in cafes). 
75 Finally, I shall describe the success of integration of some African students. Some of
them agree to become local intermediaries in their local African space of origin. In this
case these former students do not only decide to stay loyal to the movement but they
express  a  positive  experience  in  the  movement.  Most  of  them  acknowledge
awkwardness from the Turks taking care of the Light Houses but find justifications for
it.
76 As D., now a teacher in Dakar puts it:
I cannot complain. They were harsh sometimes, but for me it was normal, I was
Muslim myself so had no problem with the religious duties we had. And I think it
was my education, but I thought that it was normal they were strict. It was the
same at home in Dakar so I guess that’s why I adapted. And also this curfew thing I
can understand, because in Istanbul there are lots of drugs and everything. So the
early curfew was for our safety that’s all.30
77 A significant part of these students agreeing to become local intermediaries for the GM
(but  certainly  not  all  of  them)  corresponds  to  former  grant-holder  students  of  the
Turkish schools in Africa, from poor origin. They fell indebted to the GM for the help
they received and accepted a position in the Gülen Movement where they become local
intermediaries. Bourdieu and Saint-Martin (1982) talk about “oblats” in the Christian
Church: these young people from poor origins who are put in the Church early and
dedicate their life to it because they feel they owe the movement their life. This is the
case for the following profile.
78 D.C., a 30 years-old Kenyan teacher corresponds to this profile. A very good student
from a modest family, D.C. had studied in the public school of Nairobi until high school
when he was recruited by the Gülen school of the Light Academy with a scholarship
according to his  results  in a national  exam. In 2004,  D.C.  was proposed to study in
Haceteppe  Ankara  with  a  movement  scholarship.  He  was  then  offered  a  job  as  a
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professor in a secondary school in Nairobi. In the interview, D.C. kept expressing his
gratitude to the Hizmet, explaining that he could not have studied for such a long time
and discover the world if he had not been contacted by the Gülen Movement when he
was 15 years old31.
 
Circulation and blockings
79 The GM’s opening to African students is a challenging experience for the GM since it
brings to light the limits of its strategy of expansion. Indeed, the lack of information on
the reality of the movement and the rigidity of its core structure where practices and
discourses differ from the one in the fringe circles create reactions of opposition that
are  counter-productive  in  the  objective  of  the  GM to  spread its  influence over  the
future elite of African countries. Beyond this, however, lies the question of the strategy
of  development  of  the  GM:  the  “strategic  ambiguity”,  which  characterized  the
movement’s  adaptability  and  allowed  it  to  grow  by  using  different  discourses  and
practices according to the places in order to reach a much wider population than those
of the faithful followers of the Cemaat. This is the biggest strength of the movement but
might also become its biggest limit: How to integrate foreigners in such a movement? 
80 Above  all,  our  analysis  tried  to  show  the  limits  of  the  concept  of  soft  power  for
characterizing a concrete situation of influence of a Turkish private actor in Africa and
the theoretical bias it implies. 
81 First, opposing the idea of passivity of African recipients of a Turkish soft power in the
form of the Gülen schools, students arriving in Istanbul will put into motion “tactics” in
order to bypass, negotiate or reappropriate the strategies of management of the Gülen
movement. Here the fact of possessing economic and social capital seems critical for
the terms in which students agree to play the institutional game of the movement. 
82 Then, in terms of the precision of the term ‘soft power’, the idea that every initiative
led by a private or public actor would necessarily promote Turkish soft power, also has
to be questioned. Indeed, our case study, without denying the link with the AKP in the
Turkish schools’ expansion, shows here most of all a private group’s own strategy of
expansion, in which organizational stakes come first, even though their effects tend to
go against the interest of Turkish state in the long run (since students refuse to “play
the game”). Reciprocally, the latest crisis opposing Erdoğan’s government to the Gülen
movement  exemplified  in  a  very  striking  manner  how much Turkey’s  strategies  of
power abroad are the result of different social groups which can collaborate during
certain periods (as was the case for the AKP and the Gülen Movement until December
2013) and then oppose each other violently in other periods (as it has been since then).
This has been to the point that the Turkish government leads a campaign of lobbying
on African states to push them to close the Gülen schools (known as the Turkish schools
in Africa), an initiative that is clearly threatening to weaken Turkey’s representation
abroad (Maasho 2015), contradicting furthermore the relevance of a single and vague
“Turkish soft power”. 
83 At last, the idea that the attractiveness of Turkey would be increased by the Turkish
schools in Africa has not been confirmed by the field research. If those schools manage
to  channel  students  to  Turkey  or  a  Turkish  university,  it  appears  that  they  do  so
because of a curtailed horizon of possibilities, in a period where worldwide mobility has
Challenging the Soft Power Analysis
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 21 | 2015
17
never  been  so  constrained  for  Africans,  rather  than  by  the  supposedly  growing
attractiveness of Turkey, which is impossible to measure. 
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NOTES
1. Concerning the Gülen/Erdogan crisis, see Balcı (2014a; 2014b). 
2. Hizmet, meaning “the service” in Turkish, is one of the higher duties of Islam. The followers of
Gülen call the GM the Hizmet. When referring to the Hizmet as the religious group, capital letter
will be used, while the hizmet, as a duty is written in small letter. About neo-brotherhoods, see
Roy (2002: 127).
3. A first attempt has been done briefly and unsatisfyingly by Tittensor (2014) in its chapter 4
“Voices from within, voices from without”.
4. The three evils of humanityaccording to Said Nursi.
5. The other one was left in another private university not pertaining to the movement, but was
socialized in the religious group.
6. Ișık  evleri (“Light  Houses”)  are  apartments  for  students  to  stay  where they  can learn  the
teachings of Fethullah Gülen and lead their lives according to his principles. 
7. Istanbul is the main destination for African Students from the Gülen Movement, but they are
sometimes directed to other cities in Turkey where Universities close to the Gülen Movement
exist such as Zirve Üniversitesi in Gaziantep. Our field research only focuses on Istanbul.
8. 8,500 euros in Nairobi, 3,500 euros in Johannesburg and 4,000 euros in Dakar for school fees
and boarding for the year 2015/2016.
9. Interview conducted in Turkish, Johannesburg, October 9, 2013. Translation by the author.
10. Interview conducted in Turkish, Istanbul, March 10, 2014. Translation by the author.
11. Interview conducted in French, Istanbul, June 11,2013. Translation by the author.
12. Interview conducted in French, Dakar, September 16, 2014. Translation by the author.
13. Interview conducted in Turkish, Istanbul, Marh 1, 2014. Translation by the author.
14. Interview conducted in French, Istanbul, February 20, 2013. Translation by the author.
15. Yet it should be noted that Turkish teachers in Africa do not only target Muslim students.
During our research we met two non-Muslim African students (from South Africa) who decided
to study in Istanbul thanks to the movement. According to them, Turkish teachers would not
mobilize the same type of discourse when talking to the Christian students.
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16. Interview conducted in English in Istanbul, November 16, 2013. Translation by the author.
17. For a critical analysis of these discourses see in this EJTS issue, Yohanan Benhaïm and Kerem
Öktem’s article on Turkish soft power discourse.
18. Interview conducted in French, in Dakar, September 16, 2014. Translation by the author.
19. The Gülen Movement’s expansion is indeed not based on a direct religious proselytism. 
20. Abla means older sister. It is used in the GM presented as a metaphor of a family. It refers to
persons of a higher status in the hierarchy of the movement. In the Light Houses, the abla (and
abi for men) looks after the other people of the house, and makes sure they respect the proper
principles of life in the house.
21. Participant observation led in Fatih University, Istanbul, March 27, 2013.
22. Two  cases  of  conversions  have  been  reported  by  students  in  Fatih  University  but
unfortunately no interviews have been carried out with the converted yet.
23. Interview conducted in French in Istanbul, June 11, 2013. Translation by the author.
24. Interview conducted in  English and Turkish,  Istanbul,  March 1,  2014.  Translation by the
author.
25. Ibid. 
26. Interview conducted in English, Istanbul, March 6, 2014. Translation by the author. 
27. Based on an interview conducted in French in Istanbul, June 11, 2014.
28. Based on participant observation led in Istanbul, March 22, 2013.
29. Interview conducted in French in Dakar, August 18, 2015. Translation by the author.  
30. Interview conducted in French, in Dakar, September 16, 2014. Translation by the author.
31. Based on an interview conducted in English in Nairobi, May 26, 2011.
ABSTRACTS
This article will try to challenge the concept of soft power relying upon a case study of African
students coming to Turkey through the channel of the Gülen Movement, a religiously inspired
social  movement.  Through  a  micro-level  analysis  of  African  students’  trajectories  and
experiences in the Gülen Movement, I will try to show the limits of the concept of soft power as a
category of  analysis  showing that  it  is  not  only  vague,  but  can also  be  proven wrong in  its
theoretical grounds.
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